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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
of such WTO adjudications, may strategically decide to construct their legal arguments
accordingly.
The Brazil-Retreaded Tyres dispute raises significant issues for the W TO and the multi-
lateral trading system. The system's ability to accommodate the nontrade policy goals of WTO
members is a continuing challenge. In this case, the decision appears to play to the arguments
of both proponents and opponents of trade liberalization. It arguably broadens the scope of
Article XX by showing some deference to the nontrade policy objectives of WTO members and
a greater appreciation of the complexity of environmental problems and the associated need
for a comprehensive response involving a variety of measures. This approach is balanced by the
need to ensure that in efforts to achieve such nontrade objectives, the requisite measures must
be nondiscriminatory. Moreover, the Appellate Body seems to be receptive to the particular
conditions and policy objectives of less economically developed WTO members, which may
not be able to adhere to the multilateral trading system's neutral rules and requirements of non-
discrimination. This change may indicate the early signs of accepting distinctions between
WTO members based on their need for special or differential treatment when interpreting the
GATT exceptions. Finally, the question of whether the system can coexist with FTAs contin-
ues to be a salient one since a W TO member's obligations under one treaty, including the
enforcement thereof, may lead to violations of another.
KEVIN R. GRAY
Trade Law Bureau, Government of Canada*
Expulsion ofsuspected terrorists- obligation of non-refoulement-diplomatic assurances-absoluteprohi-
bition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment
SAADI V. ITALY. App. No. 37201/06. At <http://www.echr.coe.int>.
European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), February 28, 2008.
In Saadi v. Italy,1 decided February 28, 2008, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) held that the deportation of Nassim Saadi to Tunisia would constitute a breach of
Italy's positive obligations under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.2
Citing Soering v. United Kingdom3 and Chahal v. United Kingdom,4 the ECHR reaffirmed the
long-established principle that Article 3 prohibits the transfer of an individual to a country
where there is a "real risk" that he will be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment. The principle is not to be applied differently when an individual is sus-
pected of involvement with terrorist activity. Since the Article 3 prohibition is absolute, the
danger that an individual might pose to the community cannot be taken into account when
assessing the risk to the individual upon transfer. States may rely on diplomatic assurances to
* The opinions expressed in this case report are those of the author and in no way represent those of the Gov-
ernment of Canada.
'App. No. 37201/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 28, 2008).
2 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, ETS No. 5,213
UNTS 222, available at <http://www.echr.coe.int>.
3 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
4 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831 (reported by Beate Rudolf at 92 AJIL 70 (1998)). The "real risk" language comes
from this judgment, which is discussed further below.
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satisfy their Article 3 obligations only when, in practical terms, the assurances constitute a suf-
ficient guarantee that the individual rights of the proposed transferee will be respected.
Nassim Saadi was in Italy on a residence permit when, in October 2002, he was arrested and
placed in pretrial detention. He remained in detention throughout a long prosecutorial and
appellate process. Though not convicted of any terrorist offenses in Italy, he was convicted in
abstentia of terrorist offenses by a military court in Tunis and sentenced to twenty years'
imprisonment. In August 2006, two days after Saadi's release from custody in Italy, the Italian
minister of the interior issued a deportation order. Soon thereafter, Saadi was taken into pre-
deportation detention. In issuing the order, the minister stated that "it was apparent from the
documents in the file" that the applicant had played an "active role" in an organization respon-
sible for providing logistical and financial support to persons belonging to fundamentalist
Islamist cells in Italy and abroad (para. 32). Consequently, his conduct was disturbing public
order and threatening national security (id.). Saadi then applied for political asylum, claiming
that he was at risk of torture and political and religious reprisals if returned to Tunisia. His
application for asylum was deemed inadmissible on the basis of national security. Following
the intervention of numerous nongovernmental organizations and the production of docu-
mentation relating to incidences of torture and ill treatment in Tunisia, the deportation was
stayed by the Italian courts. Saadi also requested that the ECHR issue a stay.5
Before the ECHR, Saadi claimed that it was "a matter of common knowledge" that persons
detained on the basis of terrorist involvement were subjected to torture and persecution in
Tunisia (para. 98). On that basis, he claimed that there was a real risk of him being exposed
to such treatment. Italy, joined by the United Kingdom as a third-party intervenor, 6 claimed
that the ECHR's standard, as outlined in Chahal, ought to be amended and recast in the con-
text of individuals who pose a particular danger to the community as a whole.
Chahal concerned a Sikh activist who had entered the United Kingdom illegally but sub-
sequently benefited from a general amnesty for illegal entrants. He was active in the establish-
ment of the International Sikh Youth Federation and was later arrested and charged with con-
spiracy to kill the prime minister of India. A deportation order was issued as a result of Chahal's
political activities, but he claimed that such deportation would violate his Article 3 rights
because it would expose him to the risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment. The ECHR held that Article 3 conferred an absolute right on all within the jurisdic-
tion of the state. As a result, the United Kingdom could not rely on national security interests
to justify the deportation of the applicant. The ECHR held that the
prohibition provided by Article 3 against ill-treatment is absolute in expulsion cases. Thus,
whenever substantial grounds have been shown for believing that an individual would face
a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if removed to another State,
the responsibility of the Contracting State to safeguard him or her against such treatment
5 A full recital of the factual background, including Saadi's exhaustion of domestic remedies, is provided in para-
graphs 9 to 57 of the judgment.
6 Article 36 of the European Convention provides that the ECHR may permit member states to intervene when
one of its nationals is an applicant (Article 36(1)) or when it would be in the interest of the proper administration
of justice (Article 36(2)). Any time after giving the respondent state notice of an application, the ECHR may give
a third party permission to submit written comments or, in exceptional cases, to take part in hearings (Article 36(2),
Rule 44(2)). In Saadi the United Kingdom intervened under Article 36(2) and Rule 44(2).
2008]
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is engaged in the event of expulsion. In these circumstances, the activities of the individual
in question, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a material consideration.7
According to Italy and the United Kingdom in Saadi, this "real risk" standard is not appro-
priate in the prevailing climate of an international terrorist threat. The United Kingdom, in
particular, argued (paras. 117-23) that a state ought to be entitled to take the danger to the
public into account when the applicant is considered to be involved in terrorist activity; the
applicant should be required to produce evidence showing a higher risk of exposure to pro-
hibited treatment than is required under Chahal. The case of suspected terrorists causes special
difficulties for states, the United Kingdom argued, because it is unlikely that another state will
receive such individuals and because criminal sanctions or surveillance-type measures may not
provide adequate protection to the community as a whole. Since states are entitled to use immi-
gration measures to protect themselves against external security threats, they ought to be enti-
tled to demand that dangerous individuals establish their being at greater risk before a prospec-
tive expulsion would engage Article 3.
Although the ECHR accepted that contracting states have a right to control the entry, res-
idence, and expulsion of aliens and that the European Convention includes no right to political
asylum (para. 124), it reasserted its long-standing position that state action relating to expul-
sion is restricted by the absolute nature of Article 3 and by the implied positive obligation not
to send individuals to states where they are at real risk of prohibited treatment (para. 125). The
absolute nature of the prohibition on torture and on inhuman and degrading treatment or pun-
ishment "enshrines one of the fundamental values of democratic societies" (para. 127) and
must therefore be maintained, even in times of emergency or war. Notwithstanding that states
now face "immense difficulties" in combating the contemporary international terrorist threat
(para. 137), a person's suspected involvement in terrorist activity does not affect the absolute
nature of their rights under Article 3: "As the prohibition of torture and of inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment is absolute, irrespective of the victim's conduct, the nature of the
offence allegedly committed by the applicant is therefore irrelevant for the purposes of Article
3" (para. 127 (citations omitted)).
The ECHR noted (para. 141) that it had reached a similar conclusion in Chahal, and held
that, even if it were true that the terrorist threat has increased since the time of that decision,
the change in background conditions does not undercut the absolute nature of Article 3. As
to the United Kingdom's first claim-that the sending state ought to be able to balance the
community interest against the risk to the proposed transferee who is a suspected terrorist-the
ECHR held that a person's conduct is irrelevant to Article 3 assessments (para. 137). In this
respect, Article 3 provides a greater degree of protection (para. 138) than that afforded by
Articles 32 and 33 of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.8 The
ECHR further concluded that the United Kingdom's idea of balancing the risk to the indi-
vidual and the dangerousness of that individual to the community as a whole was "miscon-
ceived" (para. 139):
The concepts of "risk" and "dangerousness" in this context do not lend themselves to a
balancing test because they are notions that can only be assessed independently of each
7 Chahal, para. 80 (citations omitted).
8 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 UNTS 150.
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other. Either the evidence adduced before the Court reveals that there is a substantial risk
if the person is sent back or it does not. The prospect that he may pose a serious threat to
the community if not returned does not reduce in any way the degree of risk of ill treatment
that the person may be subject to on return. (Id.)
This finding led the Court also to reject the United Kingdom's second claim-that where
an individual is considered to pose a considerable danger to national security, Article 3 would
be breached only if he were "more likely than not" to be subjected to prohibited treatment in
the receiving state. This is a more demanding standard than that which is required under the
ECHR's established jurisprudence, which speaks only of a "real risk" of prohibited treatment.9
The ECHR considered the related matter of what evidence it should take into account when
assessing whether the applicant has established a "real risk." It held that the burden was on the
applicant to adduce evidence to establish that risk (para. 129), though the ECHR might also
consider evidence obtained propio motu (para. 128). Using that evidence, the Court would
"examine the foreseeable consequences" of the proposed expulsion, "bearing in mind the sit-
uation [in the receiving country] and [the applicant's] personal circumstances" (para. 130).
Thus, although an Article 3 assessment is necessarily speculative, it must be conducted with
care and rigor (para. 142) and take into account the circumstances of the case in relation to what
the sending state knew or ought to have known at the time of the deportation (para. 133). The
Court found in this case that there were substantial grounds to believe that Saadi was at a real
risk of being subjected to treatment prohibited by Article 3 upon return to Tunisia and, as a
result, that his deportation would constitute a breach of Italy's obligations under that article.
Although it did not form part of the unanimous judgment in the case, the concurrence of
Judge Zupan6i considered the role that evidentiary presumptions might play in Article 3
assessments of proposed transfers. Noting that such assessments were difficult in view of their
speculative nature and the severity of the consequences for an individual if the risk is under-
estimated, Zupandi6 held that it "borders on the inquisitorial" to make the applicant bear not
only the burden of establishing "real risk," but also the risk of being subjected to such treatment
itself. In his view, "the minimal empathy and the humanness of human rights dictate that a
person threatened with expulsion should not bear an excessive burden of proof or risk of non-
persuasion." Thus, he argued that a person subject to expulsion ought to be required only to
"produce a shadow of a doubt" as to his future safety, at which point a presumption in his favor
would arise and the burden of rebutting that presumption would fall on the contracting state.
As a final matter the ECHR briefly considered the claim that a state's Article 3 obligations
could be satisfied by means of diplomatic assurances from the receiving state. While implying
that diplomatic assurances might be sufficient in some cases, the ECHR did not find Tunisia's
representations-a mere outline of the domestic law applicable to Saadi-sufficient in this
case. In a case where reliable sources report that prohibited treatment is either engaged in, or
tolerated by, the receiving state, the mere existence of domestic prohibitions on torture and ill
treatment is insufficient to ensure the adequate protection of an individual's Article 3 rights
(para. 147). Diplomatic assurances alone are also not enough; such assurances need to be eval-
uated in the particular, practical circumstances of each case (para. 148).
' See, e.g., Soering; Chahal.
20081
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The Saadi decision has been widely welcomed by human rights organizations, including
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Human Rights First. While it constitutes
a serious rebuff to Italy's deportation policy, which had been the subject of some concern on
the part of the UN Committee Against Torture, 0 perhaps the case's greatest significance is in
relation to the United Kingdom's assertion that the Chahal standard is inappropriate in the
context of contemporary counterterrorism. In 2005, Prime Minister Tony Blair remarked that
"the circumstances of our national security have now self evidently changed" and that states
ought to be permitted to rely on diplomatic assurances when deporting individuals believed
to present a danger." This position reflects the United Kingdom's post-9/1 1 view that the
challenge posed by international terrorism is radically different to that which existed before and
therefore requires a recalibration of legal standards in international human rights law. In par-
ticular, the United Kingdom has asserted the right to deport non-UK citizens involved in ter-
rorist activity pursuant to memorandums of understanding with, or diplomatic assurances by,
the receiving states. This practice has been widely criticized; human rights advocates argue that
such assurances are nonbinding, unenforceable, and therefore inadequate to protect the fun-
damental individual right to be free from torture or inhuman and degrading treatment or pun-
ishment. Although the Saadi Court did not hold that diplomatic assurances can never be suf-
ficient to satisfy a state's positive obligations under Article 3, it did suggest that the
circumstances in which such assurances would be sufficient are relatively narrow: situations in
which "such assurances provided, in their practical application," effective protection against
violation of European Convention rights. The laying down of such a test-vague though it
is- gives rise to an especially important question: within the context of any particular depor-
tation procedure, who is to assess the practical sufficiency of assurances?
At first blush, one might suspect that the assessment would be conducted at the executive
level of the deporting state: having received such assurances through diplomatic channels, the
executive branch would decide on whether the assurances were sufficient or not. The ECHR's
approach in Saadi to diplomatic assurances seems to require, however, the active involvement
of least one other branch of government-at least if the deportation order is challenged, which
would presumably happen almost always. In that context, the judiciary would be the natural
choice, and the UK Court of Appeal has taken the view that the Saadi judgment essentially
obligates courts to become involved (as opposed to deferentially deferring to the executive) in
the process of determining whether any particular diplomatic assurances are sufficient to meet
a state's Article 3 obligations.
In AS & DD (Libya) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,12 the Court of Appeal
endorsed the ECHR's insistence in Saadi (para. 142) on the application of "rigorous criteria"
and "close scrutiny" when considering whether diplomatic assurances are sufficient under Arti-
cle 3. When the secretary of state for the Home Department claimed that this test was fulfilled
by means of a memorandum of understanding between the United Kingdom and Libya, the
Court held that the sufficiency of such agreements is to be determined on a case-by-case basis,
taking into account the concrete circumstances in the receiving state. The Court of Appeal
'0 See UN Committee Against Torture, Consideration of the Fourth Periodic Report of Italy, UN Doc. CAT/
C/SR.721 (May 11, 2007).
11 [Prime Minister] Tony Blair, Press Conference (Aug. 5, 2005), at <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/
Page804l .asp>.
12 [2008] EWCA Civ 289.
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therefore turned to the standard explicated in Saadi, where the ECHR rejected the United
Kingdom's argument that the contemporary terrorist threat required a more permissive appli-
cation of the non-refoulement principle in relation to individuals deemed (by the executive
branch) to pose national security risks. In the particular circumstances presented in AS & DD
(Libya), the Court of Appeal found that the diplomatic assurances offered were inadequate.
While Libya provided the assurances in good faith, the unpredictable personal and political
pragmatism of the Qaddafi regime rendered those assurances unreliable, leading the Court to
conclude that they failed to provide sufficient protection for the applicants' rights. 13
The U.S. Supreme Court took a different approach to an analogous question in Munafv.
Geren. 4 The petitioners in that case were U.S. citizens detained in Iraq by U.S. forces serving
as part of the Multinational Force-Iraq and due to be transferred to the Iraqi government to
face various criminal charges. They argued that the United States could not transfer them into
Iraqi custody, because doing so would expose them to a risk of torture. Eschewing an approach
that would require "close scrutiny" of such decisions, the Supreme Court held that the question
of whether or not to transfer an individual to the custody of another state was a question for
the executive branch. Notwithstanding that the risk of torture was "a matter of serious con-
cern" to the Court, it held "that it is for the political branches, not the judiciary, to assess prac-
tices in foreign countries and to determine national policy in light of those assessments."' 5 This
holding stands in strong contrast to the ECHR's approach in Saadi and that of the UK Court
of Appeal in AS & DD (Libya). 6 Notably, however, the Supreme Court did not completely
foreclose the possibility that federal courts might scrutinize an "extreme case in which the Exec-
utive has determined that a detainee [in United States custody] is likely to be tortured but
decides to transfer him anyway." 7
The different approaches of the UK Court of Appeal in AS & DD (Libya) and the U.S.
Supreme Court in Munafmay result in a serious operational difficulty for the United Kingdom
and United States. The United Kingdom may find itself unable to surrender or transfer indi-
viduals captured and detained in the course of current military-support operations for the Iraqi
and Afghan governments because UK troops are bound by the terms of the European Con-
vention when they act abroad, with the consequence that any individuals in the custody of
those troops enjoy Convention rights regardless of citizenship or location. 8 Although the
United Kingdom may attempt to circumvent this limitation by means of diplomatic assur-
ances, the adequacy of those assurances would be subject to challenge in the domestic courts.
13 Id., paras. 68-82.
14 128 S.Ct. 2207 (June 12, 2008).
15 128 S.Ct. at 2225.
16 [2008] EWCA Civ 289.
17 128 S.Ct. at 2226. See also the concurring opinion of Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer.
" R (AI-Skeini) v. Sec'y of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 26 (see case report in this issue by Ralph Wilde).
Although R (AI-Jeddah) (FC) v. Secretary ofStatefor Defence, [20071 UKHL 58 (reported byAlexander Orakhelash-
viii at 102 AJIL 000 (2008)), provides that action otherwise prohibited by the European Convention may be per-
missible if undertaken pursuant to a Security Council resolution and limited to the extent required, it seems unlikely
that this decision has the potential to undermine Saadi, given thejus cogens nature of the prohibition on torture and
the absolute nature ofArticle 3. Decisions of the European Court of First Instance tend to support this analysis-see,
for example, Ayadi v. Council, [2006] ECR 11-2139 -although a decision by the European Court of Justice is
awaited.
20081
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By contrast, Munafsuggests that the United States-operating in broadly analogous circum-
stances-would not face the same potential limitations with regard to potential transfers. The
apparent implication is that, depending on the identity of the custodial state, individuals
detained in the course of the so-called war on terror may have different degrees of enforceable
protections against refoulement, notwithstanding the absolute andjus cogens nature of the pro-
hibition on torture. It remains to be seen whether this lack of parallelism will manifest itself
in operational arrangements between the United Kingdom and United States, whereby (for
example) individuals who are thought to be sought by the Iraqi or Afghan governments are
taken into custody only by the United States and not by the United Kingdom. What is certain,
however, is that the two states' different standards regarding judicial analysis of the risk of tor-
ture and the adequacy of diplomatic assurances has the potential to undermine the ECHR's
effort in Saadi to reinforce the European Convention's absolute prohibition against torture.
FIONA DE LONDRAS
University College Dublin School ofLaw, Ireland
Treaty enforcement-Vienna Convention on Consular Relations-International Court ofjustice-federal-
ism-self-execution of treaties-foreign affairs powers of the executive
MEDELLIN v. TEXAS. 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008).
United States Supreme Court, March 25, 2008.
In Medellin v. Texas,1 a 6-3 majority of the U.S. Supreme Court held that the decision of
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Avena case 2 was not automatically binding as
domestic law within the United States, and that the president, absent a congressional act,
lacked the power to enforce the decision against U.S. states. The ICJ had decided inAvena that
with regard to 51 Mexican nationals on death rows in ten U.S. states, the United States was
in breach of its obligations under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
to provide consular notification to foreign nationals who are detained or arrested, and that the
United States must provide "review and reconsideration" of the convictions and sentences of
those 51 individuals.3 The Supreme Court rejected petitioner Jos6 Medellin's argument that
as one those named in Avena, he was entitled to review of his state conviction and sentence
because Avena preempted contrary Texas state law and also because Texas was bound by a Feb-
ruary 2005 memorandum from President Bush stating U.S. intent to comply with Avena. The
Supreme Court rejected Medellin's claim, holding that "neither Avena nor the President's
Memorandum constitutes directly enforceable federal law that pre-empts state limitations on
the filing of successive habeas petitions" (p. 1348).
In 1969, the United States became party to the Vienna Convention and to its Optional Pro-
tocol, the latter of which provides that disputes arising out of the application or interpretation
' 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008).
2 Avena (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 ICJ REP. 12 (Mar. 31).
3 See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States, ICJ Decision Regarding Mexicans on Death
Row in United States, 98 AJIL 364 (2004); Dinah L. Shelton, Case Report: Case Concerning Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), 98 AJIL 559 (2004).
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